- Solana Company, listed on Nasdaq as HSDT, booked $2.512m of staking revenue in the second quarter. The rewards were automatically restaked, so no cash came in.
- Running the business used roughly $11.892m of cash. The company raised about $12m by selling equity to cover it.
- The same filing shows a $25.389m realised loss on digital assets, $11.116m of general and administrative costs and a $30.256m net loss.
A company can book revenue and still run out of money at the same time. Solana Company’s second quarter is a clean example of how: $2.5m of staking revenue recognised, not a penny of it in the bank, and roughly $12m of new shares sold to keep the business running.
If you own shares in a company whose whole purpose is holding a cryptocurrency, the number that actually matters to you is how much of that cryptocurrency sits behind each share you own. Selling new shares to pay the electricity bill and the salaries shrinks that number, quietly, every quarter, even when the itself has done nothing wrong.
It’s also the reason these companies are being looked at differently by the people who decide what counts as an ordinary listed business.
Revenue that never becomes money
Start with staking, because the whole story turns on it. Solana, like most modern , is kept running by people who lock up their coins as a kind of security deposit. Do the job honestly and the network pays you in newly issued coins. That’s staking, and the payments are staking rewards.
Solana Company earned roughly 31,200 SOL that way over the quarter, worth about $2.512m, and recognised it as revenue. Then those coins were automatically restaked: put straight back to work rather than sold.
So the revenue is real in the sense that the company genuinely owns more SOL than it did before. It just isn’t money. The cash-flow statement says so explicitly, subtracting the staking revenue as a non-cash item before it works out how much actual cash the business consumed. Selling the SOL could turn it into cash later. Nobody sold it.
Where the cash actually came from
Meanwhile the business used about $11.892m of cash running itself, with $11.116m of that in general and administrative expenses: the staff, the advisers, the audit, the listing costs. Those bills are paid in dollars and they don’t wait.
The money came from issuing equity, roughly $12m of it. In plain terms, the company printed and sold new shares.
This is the part worth slowing down on. When a treasury company raises money by selling shares and uses it to buy more of the token, existing holders can come out flat or ahead: there are more shares, but there’s also more SOL behind them. When the money goes on running costs instead, the pile of tokens doesn’t grow. The share count does. Everyone who already owned shares owns a slightly thinner slice of the same pile.
Do it once and it’s a rounding error. Do it every quarter and it becomes the main thing happening to the shares.
The $25m loss is a different kind of number
The filing also shows a $25.389m realised loss on digital assets, about 10.1 times the staking revenue, and a $30.256m net loss overall.
That headline figure needs handling carefully. A realised loss on digital assets is an accounting entry recording that assets are worth less than what was paid for them. It is not $25m walking out of the door in cash. The cash story and the accounting story move separately here, which is exactly why the two look so different: a company reporting a $30m net loss burned closer to $12m of actual money.
Both matter, for different reasons. The accounting loss tells you the treasury bought high. The cash burn tells you how often the company has to come back to the market.
Why the token price makes this worse or better
The two halves feed each other. If SOL falls, the treasury is worth less, and the shares usually fall with it. A company raising a fixed $12m of cash then has to issue more shares to get it, because each one is cheaper. More dilution per dollar raised, at precisely the moment the underlying asset is weakest.
That’s the structural bit, and it isn’t unique to this company. It’s the same mechanism sitting behind the index providers now weighing whether treasury companies belong in mainstream equity indices: a business whose operating costs are funded by share issuance rather than by operations doesn’t behave like a normal listed company, whatever it holds.
What to watch
Whether the next quarter’s cash needs are met the same way. One equity raise to cover operations is a funding decision. Four in a row is a business model, and it would show up as a steadily rising share count against a treasury that isn’t growing to match.
Also watch whether the company starts selling staking rewards rather than restaking them. That single change would convert non-cash revenue into actual cash and reduce the need to issue shares, at the cost of the treasury compounding more slowly. Which way it goes tells you what management thinks the priority is.